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STARE DECISIS AMONG [SIC] THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
*Taylor Mattis
**Kenneth G. Yalowitz

What precedential impact should be accorded to decisions of the Appellate Court of Illinois? Authors Mattis and Yalowitz examine the Illinois
history of the stare decisis doctrine as it relates to Illinois appellate decisions. They demonstrate the inadequacy of the present Illinois approach,
which requires trial courts to follow appellate court decisions of any division while those divisions remain free to adopt conflicting positions. Alternative approaches to this question are then analyzed in detail. The authors
conclude by recommending a two-pronged approach. First, all appellate
court divisions should recognize decisions of coordinate divisions as binding unless clearly erroneous. Second, if an appellate division decides that a
decision of a coordinate division was erroneous, its contrary opinion
should be regarded as having overruled the prior decision. Such an approach would eliminate inappropriate vestiges of territorialism, promote
stability in the law, and afford trial courts clear guidance.

Whenever a judicial system employs a three-tiered structure with trial
courts, an intermediate appellate court or courts, and a high court, the issue
arises of what precedential value decisions of the intermediate court or
courts 1 shall be accorded. Illinois has had intermediate appellate courts
since 1877, and for more than a century has struggled with this issue. This
Article will examine the history of the appellate court structure in terms of
the precedential effect of its decisions; explore, by comparing other systems,
the alternatives to the present effect given to appellate court decisions; and
consider what improvements can be made in the approach currently followed by the Illinois courts.
STARE DECIsIS DEFINED

This Article presupposes a working knowledge of the general concept of
stare decisis, a concept used here synonymously with precedent, as the
principle stating that a court will stand by its own decisions as well as by

* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University, School of Law; B.A., University of
Alabama; J.D., University of Miami; LL.M., Yale University. Member of Illinois, Florida, and
Nebraska Bars.
** B.S., Illinois State University; J.D., Southern Illinois University, School of Law.
Member of Illinois Bar.
1. The ambiguity of the word "court" must be tolerated in this study', for sometimes it will

be used to mean an institution-e.g., the Appellate Court of Illinois-and sometimes a panel of
judges sitting to decide a case on appeal.
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those of a higher court in a given judicial hierarchy. 2 Of course, modern
stare decisis does not mean that a point of law once decided is settled for all
time. 3 It does mean that a decision will be followed, distinguished, or overruled by the deciding court, as well as followed by lower courts in the same
judicial system. Much has been written about the subject of stare decisis
generally, elucidating the distinction between stare decisis, res judicata, and
the law of the case, and discussing the guideposts of ratio decidendi as con4
trasted to obiter dicta.
Although courts agree that stare decisis is the great fundamental principle
in our law, they use various techniques either to avoid that which has been
decided, or to justify the stagnancy of the law. 5 Thus, even if all the various
divisions of the Appellate Court of Illinois were bound by prior decisions of
any division of the court, these techniques of avoidance, especially the distinguishing of factual circumstances, would persist. Nonetheless, acceptance
of the principle of stare decisis within the appellate court would prove bene6
ficial to the Illinois judicial system.
The principle of stare decisis takes on an added dimension when it is
applied to decisions of intermediate courts rather than to the high court in a
judicial system. In common law jurisdictions, decisions of the high court
bind all courts subordinate to it in the judicial hierarchy for which it is the
summit. 7 This aspect of the principle may be termed "vertical stare decisis." The question of what vertical precedential value will be accorded to
decisions arises in connection with a study of high or intermediate appellate
courts. However, when problems of stare decisis at the intermediate appellate level are considered, the additional effect of decisions upon coordinate
courts, divisions, or branches must be addressed. This aspect of the principle may be termed "horizontal stare decisis."

2. The doctrine embodies a judicial policy that a determination of a point of law by a court
will generally be followed by a court of the same rank if a subsequent case presents the same
legal problem, although different parties are involved in the subsequent case. The rationale
behind the policy is the need to promote certainty, stability, and predictability of the law.
Brewer's Dairy v. Dolloff, 268 A.2d 636, 638 (Me. 1970).
3. Between 1861 and 1966, the English House of Lords would not overrule its own decisions. F. MORISON, COURTS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN ENGLAND 144-46 (1973). Until
1949, decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada were reviewable by the Privy Council, so the
Supreme Court of Canada would not overrule its own decisions. Now, the highest judicial body
in England will overrule itself and the Supreme Court of Canada will overrule its decisions. See
generally Curtis, Stare Decisis at Common Law in Canada, 12 U.B.C.L. REV. 1 (1978).

4. E.g., R.

LEFLAR, APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS

(1974), collecting, citing and excerpt-

ing many sources.
5. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 62-64 (1960).
6. The benefits of stare decisis in the promotion of visible justice, evenhandedness of the
law regardless of parties, uniformity, rational legal planning and reduction of forum shopping,
are thoroughly discussed in the literature and will not be extensively developed here.
7. Of course, decisions of the high court serve as precedent in the deciding court until
they are overruled in view of changed circumstances.
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SKETCHES OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

The vertical and horizontal aspects of stare decisis lead to a number of
possible approaches when considering decisions of intermediate courts.
First, the decisions of intermediate courts may bind neither the trial
courts nor the intermediate courts in the-judicial system. Under this approach, no stare decisis effect, even upon the deciding court, is attached to
the decisions of an appellate court.
Second, the decisions of the intermediate courts may bind the trial courts
in the particular geographical district in which the respective appellate
courts sit, but not bind other intermediate courts in the judicial system.
Under this approach, decisions of the appellate courts are granted vertical,
but not horizontal, stare decisis effect.
Third, the decisions of the intermediate court (this assumes one court in
the institutional sense, although there may be numerous divisions of the
court) may bind all trial courts in the judicial system, and also bind the
coordinate divisions, panels, or branches in the judicial system. Under this
approach, the attributes of both vertical and horizontal stare decisis obtain.
Finally, the decisions of the intermediate court may bind all the trial
courts within the state, yet not bind coordinate branches of the intermediate
court. This is the current status of stare decisis as developed in the Appellate Court of Illinois. 8 The vertical stare decisis found in the Illinois system
is analogous to the spines of an umbrella: all the trial courts within the state
fall under the precedential web of each district appellate court regardless of
geographical location. There is, however, no horizontal stare decisis. 9
The judiciary article of the Illinois constitution, as adopted by the people
of the State of Illinois in 1962 and 1970, vests the judicial power of the state
in "a Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and Circuit Courts." 10 Patently,
this language indicates that a single supreme court, a single appellate court,
and numerous circuit courts are constitutionally deemed to exist in this
state. It would, therefore, seem to follow that the Appellate Court of Illinois,
organized in the five judicial districts of this state, is but one court sitting in
five separate locations for the sake of convenience. Based on this analysis, it
is difficult to comprehend how two divisions of the appellate court could
produce differing interpretations of the same law, based on similar factual
circumstances, without regarding the later division as overruling the former
decision: 11 a single court cannot logically profess to hold differing opinions on
the same question where the sole basis of the differentiation of result is the
geographic location of the forum. This, however, is the position that the
Illinois courts have adopted.

8. See Part I. C.3. of text.
9. See Part I. B. of text.
10. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1870, amended 1962).
11. If the two decisions are filed simultaneously, the stare decisis question is, of course,
evaded. See text's AFTERWORD, at 605.
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How this rather curious approach to stare decisis came about, and how it
works in operation, especially from the perspective of the trial judge, is the
subject of part I of this Article. Part II will then explore the alternative
approaches to stare decisis that may be applicable to the Illinois design and
will recommend strengthening the horizontal precedential effect of decisions
of the Appellate Court of Illinois.
I.

THE HISTORY OF THE STRUCTURE OF ILLINOIS'
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT(S) AND THE
RESULTING STARE

DECISIS EFFECTS

As already indicated, whether a judicial system has a unitary intermediate
appellate court in the institutional sense, as opposed to multiple appellate
courts, is logically related to the issue of whether decisions of the appellate
court bind that court. An understanding of the development of the judicial
structure, then, is necessary to an understanding of the stare decisis effects
of decisions at the intermediate level.
A. The Early Multiple Court Structure
Under the 1870 constitution, authorization was given to the legislature to
establish "inferior appellate courts . . . in districts formed for that purpose." 12 In 1877, the General Assembly enacted "An Act to Establish Appellate Courts" with these words:
There are hereby created four Appellate Courts in this State, to be called
the Appellate Courts in and for the districts hereby created .... Said Appellate Courts shall be Courts of Record, with seals and clerks for each respectively; and each shall be held by three of the Judges of the Circuit Court,
to be assigned in the manner hereinafter provided. 13
The four legislatively-established appellate courts existed until the 1962
revision of the constitutional article on the judiciary, article VI, became effective in 1964. Clearly, from 1877 until 1964, there were four intermediate
appellate courts in Illinois, not one. Circuit judges were assigned to appellate court service by the supreme court. Additional compensation to the circuit judges for that service was constitutionally prohibited. 14 Because the
appellate courts were distinct and separate entities, it is not surprising that a
decision of one appellate court was not binding on the other three.15

12.

ILL. CONST.

of 1870, art. VI, § 11.

13. An Act to Establish Appellate Courts, 1877 I11.Laws § 1, at 69.
14. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 11 (1870, amended 1962).
15. E.g., Barker v. Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis Ry., 149 I11.App. 520 (3d Dist. 1909),
aff'd, 243 Il1. 482, 90 N.E. 1057 (1910); McGlasson v. Housel, 127 Ill. App. 360 (1st Dist.
1906). When appellate courts would follow decisions from other districts, as they did in the
cases cited above, it was only after making it clear that they were not bound to do so. But in
Illinois Central HR. v. People ex rel. Keller, 81 Ill. App. 176, 181 (4th Dist. 1898) (emphasis
added), the appellate court for the fourth district went so far as to say: "If the [third district
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In fact, a sentence in the original section 17 ("the section 17 sentence") of
the Act to Establish Appellate Courts provided that opinions of an appellate
court "shall not be of binding authority in any cause or proceeding, other
than in that in which they may be filed."' 6 While this section 17 sentence
was in effect, a decision of, for example, the first district appellate court not
only lacked stare decisis effect on the third district appellate court, it even
lacked precedential impact in its own district. 1 7 Moreover, the trial courts
within a given district were not bound to follow a decision of the appellate
court of that district in another case, even as to a necessary part of the
opinion in the former appellate decision.' 8
However, section 17 preserved one aspect of stare decisis. Under the "law
of the case" doctrine, an appellate court decision bound both the trial court
opinion construing a state statute] be accepted as authority, it is conclusive of the case at bar,
and we feel disposed to follow it until such time as our Supreme Court shall [give] us a construction of this statute."
Laws § 1, at 65 (emphasis
16. Act to Amend the Act to Establish Appellate Courts, 1885 I11.
added). The entire statute read as follows:
§ 17. All opinions or decisions of said court upon a final hearing of any cause,
shall be reduced to writing by the court, briefly giving therein the reasons for such
opinion or decision, and be filed in the cause in which rendered; Provided, that
such opinion shall not be of binding authority in any cause or proceeding, other
than in which they [sic] may be filed.
Id. The 1885 version of § 17 amended the earlier language. The 1877 statute read as follows:
§ 17. In case the judgment, order or decree from which an appeal or writ of
error may have been prosecuted, shall be affirmed by the Appellate Court, such
court shall make an order affirming the same, and in case such judgment, order or
decree shall be reversed and the cause remanded to the court, from which such
appeal or writ of error shall have been prosecuted, for a new trial therein, said
Appellate Court shall state briefly in writing the reasons for such reversal and file
the same with the files in said cause; Provided, That the reasons so filed shall not
be of binding authority in any cause or proceeding other than that in which they
may be filed or given.
Act to Establish Appellate Courts, 1877 Ill. Laws § 17, at 72.
In 1935, the entire "section 17 sentence" was deleted beginning with the word "Provided."
Act of Apr. 25, 1935, to Amend § 17 of the Act to Establish Appellate Courts, ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 37, § 41 (1935). The remainder of the statute was repealed in 1976 "to make changes
consistent with the 1970 Constitution, the Civil Practice Act (ch. 110) and the Supreme Court
Rules (ch. ll0A)." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 41 (Smith-Hurd 1978 Supp.).
App. 530 (1st Dist. 1913); People ex
17. Journal Co. of Troy v. F.A.L. Motor Co., 181 I11.
391, 119 N.E. 344 (1918)
App. 235 (1st Dist. 1917), aff'd, 283 111.
rel. Hoyne v. Grant, 208 I11.
(decision by another division in the first district, even though certiorari had been denied by the
supreme court, not binding where the cause and parties were not the same but the legal issues
as perceived by the two divisions were identical); People ex rel. Nelson v. Sherrard State Bank,
258 II1. App. 168 (2d Dist. 1930) (second district not bound by prior decision of second district
as to validity of a contract when same issue litigated by different parties: "[I]t is doubtful if the
doctrine of stare decisis can be applied to an opinion of the Appellate Courts of this State in
view of [the section 17 sentence quoted in text, supra]." Id. at 172. See note 95 infra for
further discussion of People ex rel. Hoyne v. Grant as it relates to the effect of the supreme
court's denial of leave to appeal.
App. 339 (1st Dist. 1894); Knickerbocker Ice Co.
18. E.g., Heffron v. Knickerbocker, 57 I11.
App. 284 (1st Dist. 1894).
v. Katlinsky, 55 I11.
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on remand and the appellate court on a second appeal of the same case. 19
Yet the extent to which the section 17 "no-binding-effect" philosophy permeated the appellate courts is indicated by a statement in one opinion
doubting the viability even of the law of the case. 20 In sum, the section 17
sentence denied all stare decisis effect to appellate court decisions on: (1) the
deciding court; (2) coordinate divisions within the district of the deciding
court; (3) appellate courts in other districts; or (4) any trial court in a different case.
The inefficiency and injudiciousness of the complete absence of horizontal
or vertical stare decisis were underscored by the number of decisions litigating and relitigating these nonsubstantive issues. 2' Furthermore, the pre1935 function of the Illinois appellate courts was merely review for correctness or justice in the individual case. The design negated the institutional
function of "authoritative ascertainment and declaration of a legal precept for
such cases as the one in hand," 22 i.e., the concept of precedent. These facts
were recognized by the legislature in 1935, when the section 17 sentence
was repealed. 23 The impact of that repeal was dramatic; it went far in overturning more than a half-century of Illinois jurisprudence relating to stare
decisis among the four appellate courts.
B. The Later "Multiple" Court Structure: A Transition Period
In Hughes v. Medendorp, the third district appellate court interpreted the
effect of this repeal: "[A]n opinion of the Appellate Court is binding authority, not only upon said court, but upon all inferior courts in this State." 24
The appellant had argued that a witness was incompetent under a certain
statute and was supported in her contention by a first district decision. 25 In
reversing the trial court for failing to follow that decision, the court spoke on

19. Baum v. Hartmann, 238 I11.
519, 87 N.E. 334 (1909); Union Nat'l Bank v. Hines, 187
II1. 109, 58 N.E. 405 (1900); Gridley v. Wood, 220 I11.
App. 46 (3d Dist. 1920), rev'd on other
grounds, 305 I11.
376, 137 N.E. 251 (1922). This was true notwithstanding a change in the
personnel of the appellate court. Garrett v. Peirce, 84 11. App. 31 (2d Dist. 1899).
20. Westfall v. Albert, 107 I11.
App. 51, 53 (1st Dist. 1903), aff d, 212 Ii. 68, 72 N.E. 4
(1904). The appellate court held itself bound by the former adjudication of the branch appellate
court, res judicata, but said: "[U]nder a strict construction of the statute creating the branch
court, there may be some question as to whether its judgment in the samne case is binding upon
this court.
...
(Emphasis added.) In any event, "law of the case" is not an immutable principle. E.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. Nyman, 285 I11.
306, 120 N.E. 756 (1918).
21, At least 98 cases interpreted the § 17 sentence. See annotations at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
37, § 41 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
22. R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 1 (1941). For a more general discussion of the function of intermediate appellate courts see P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M.
ROSENBERG,

JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976); ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS

MINISTRATION, STANDARDS

RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION

OF JUDICIAL AD-

30-32 (1973).

23. See note 16 supra.
24. 294 I11.
App. 424, 427-28, 13 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (3d Dist. 1938).
25. In re Estate of Teehan, 287 111.
App. 58, 4 N.E.2d 513 (lst Dist. 1936).
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two areas affected by the repeal of the section 17 sentence: (1) it said that a
decision of an appellate court binds the deciding court in a later case-a
reversal of the prior position, 26 and (2) it held that a decision of an appellate
court of any district binds all the trial courts in the state. This latter holding
is a striking overturn of the rule that a trial court was not bound even by its
district's appellate decision in another case, 27 as well as an extension of that
2
overturn . 8
It is plausible that the intention of the legislature in deleting the section
17 sentence was to assure that a decision of one of the four appellate courts
would bind not only the trial courts, but the other appellate courts as well.
But, as to horizontal stare decisis, the Medendorp court said nothing. However, in reversing the trial court solely on the authority of the cited first
district decision, the third district proceeded as if it were bound by the
former; and it is always important to attend to what a court does in addition
to what it says.
Any assertion that Medendorp stands for horizontal stare decisis was dissi29
pated, however, by the same district's 1949 opinion in Hughes v. Bandy.
Bandy squarely faced the contention that the third district appellate court
was bound by a fourth district decision 30 on the issue of the propriety of
additur. The Bandy opinion does not develop the rationale of the contention. However, the appellee's reference to the portion of the statute remaining after the repeal of the "no binding effect" provision (the section 17 sentence), 3 1 and to Medendorp, indicates the rationale to be that the repeal of
the section 17 "no binding effect" sentence, and Medendorp's reliance on a
sister court's decision, meant that a decision of one district court was binding
on another. The Bandy court rejected the contention. While it "hoped that
all of our appellate courts would agree on the law," it held that "until our
Supreme Court has passed on the important question here presented we do
not consider that we are bound to follow such decision of one of the other
32
branches of our Appellate Court."
Thus, at the time of revision of the judiciary article of the constitution in
1962, the effect of a decision of one of the four appellate courts in Illinois

26. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
27. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
28. To hold that a trial court is bound by its district's appellate decision overturns the prior
rule; to hold that a trial court is bound by any district's appellate decision extends that overturn.
29. 336 II1. App. 472, 84 N.E.2d 664 (3d Dist. 1949), aff'd on substantive issue, 404 I11.
74,
87 N.E.2d 855 (1949).
30. Chapman v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 333 I11.
App. 529, 77 N.E.2d 883 (4th Dist. 1948).
31. See note 16 supra.
32. Hughes v. Bandy, 336 Ill. App. at 478, 84 N.E.2d at 666. A year earlier the second
district appellate court had held itself not obliged to follow the first district "[i]n the absence of
a decision on the precise issue by the Illinois Supreme Court." Parker v. Parker, 335 I11.
App.
293, 299, 81 N.E.2d 745, 748 (2d Dist. 1948). Ironically, the third district, in Bandy, cited the
second district-Parker-as authority for the proposition that one district is not obliged to
follow another district.
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was to bind all trial courts and the deciding appellate division, but not the
other divisions of the appellate court.
C. The Unitary Court Structure
1. The Constitution and the Supreme Court Rules
Article VI of the constitution of 1870 was totally revised by amendment
adopted by the voters in 1962, effective January 1, 1964. A major significance
of the amendment was that general administrative authority over all courts
in the state was vested for the first time in the supreme court. Of equal
significance was the creation of a new and independent intermediate court
structure. 3 3 In contrast, the adoption of the 1970 constitution had an insubstantial effect upon this intermediate appellate court structure. 34 Except as
indicated in footnotes, the constitutional provisions now relative to the appellate court have been in effect since 1964.
The new article VI vested the judicial power "in a Supreme Court, an
Appellate Court and Circuit Courts." 35 Section 2 provided for "five Judicial
Districts for the selection of Supreme and Appellate Court Judges." 36 This
language is unambiguous, and makes quite clear that the purpose of the
districts is for the selection of judges, not for the perpetuation of substates in
Illinois, judicially presided over by autonomous appellate courts. 37 In addition, section 2 specifically created the boundaries of the first judicial district
as Cook County, and delegated to the legislature the power to establish the
boundaries of the other districts, with the only limitation that they be compact and composed of contiguous counties. 38
33. The appellate courts established by the legislature under the 1870 constitution were
hybrid in character. Having neither a permanent constitutional status nor their own judiciary,
they lacked the independence and prestige essential to a properly conceived judicial system.
Though they served well, and often with distinction, there was little question among most
proponents of judicial reform that a new and independent intermediate appellate court structure
was a constitutional imperative. G. BRADEN AND R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN
ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 344 (1969).

34. Cohn, The Illinois Judicial Department-ChangesEffected by Constitution of 1970,
1971 U. ILL. L.F. 355: "The structure of the Illinois judicial system as established by the 1962
constitutional amendment remains unaffected by the 1970 constitution." Id. at 355. See also H.
FINS, ILLINOIS APPELLATE PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION 80-81 (1973), where the
major features of the judicial article of 1962 as incorporated in the judicial article of the 1970
constitution are outlined.
35. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1. Section 1 represents no change from section 1, art. VI, of the

1870 constitution as amended in 1962.
36. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The 1962 amendment had provided, in article VI, § 3, for
"five Judicial Districts for the selection of judges of the Supreme and Appellate Courts.'" ILL.
CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 3 (1962).
37. Subsidiary purposes, however, may well be the convenience of counsel and judges in
representing parties on appeal and hearing cases in geographic areas smaller than the state as a
whole. See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 153 (1976).
38. The boundaries of districts two through five have been established by the legislature.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 1.2-1.5 (1977).
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The constitutional provision on "Appellate Court-Organization" gave the
supreme court the authority to "prescribe by rule the number of Appellate
divisions in each Judicial District." 39 This provision dictated that at least
three judges be assigned to each division, and that a division majority was
necessary to constitute a quorum and to give effect to a decision. Further, it
required that each judicial district have at least one division, with the supreme court given the power to prescribe the times and places at which the
40
various divisions are to sit.

Additional power to regulate the operation of the appellate court was
granted to the supreme court in the constitution: "General administrative
and supervisory authority over all courts is vested in the Supreme Court and
shall be exercised by the Chief Justice in accordance with its rules ....

The

Supreme Court shall provide by rule for expeditious and inexpensive
appeals." 41
Pursuant to this authority, the supreme court has promulgated rule 22,
which provides that the court is to sit in divisions, each district having a
single division except for the first district which has five, and the second
district which has two. With the approval of the chief justice, these divisions
may sit in any district in the state. 42 The supreme court is to assign judges
to the various divisions, and the chief justice may make temporary assignments, or changes in existing assignments. 43 The rule empowers the judges
of each division to select a presiding judge,4 4 and the presiding judges of all
the divisions form the "Executive Committee of the Appellate Court of I1-

39. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
40. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 5. The present section 5 is essentially the same as section 6 of

article VI of the 1962 amendment, with the following exceptions:
1) Section 6 of the 1962 amendment began with the sentence: "The Appellate Court shall be
organized in the five Judicial Districts." ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 6 (1962). This sentence
was deleted from the 1970 Constitution by the Committee on Style, Drafting, and Submission.
SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
PROPOSALS Dec. 8, 1969-Sept. 3, 1970, 1228.
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS,

COMMITTEE

2) The sole organization change of the appellate court was the broadening of the supreme
court's power to transfer appellate court judges between districts. Under the 1962 amendment,
it was necessary that the consent of a majority of the appellate judges, in the district to which a
judge was to be transferred, be obtained prior to a transfer. This consent requirement was
deleted in the 1970 constitution, giving the supreme court full power to transfer judges between
districts.

41. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16. The 1962 revision had provided: "General administrative
authority over all courts in this State including the temporary assignment of any judge to a court
other than that for which he was selected . . . is vested in the Supreme Court.

...ILL.

art. VI, § 2 (amended 1962).
42. III. Sup. Ct. R. 22(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 22(a) (1977). In 1969 a total of 72
cases were decided by downstate divisions sitting in the first district; in 1968, 76; and in 1967,
CONST.

17. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
PROPOSALS, Dec. 8, 1969-Sept. 3, 1970, 843.

43. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 22(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 22(b) (1977).
44. Id.at 22(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 22(d).

COMMITTEE
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linois." 45 Meetings of the appellate court may be called by the executive
committee.
These provisions, allowing for the crossing of district lines by a division
and the establishment of an executive committee composed of judges from
each of the ten divisions, indicate a single appellate court in Illinois. This
position is further supported by the language of the judiciary article denominating the appellate court in the singular. Moreover, the stated constitutional purpose for the division of the state into districts is for the selection of supreme as well as appellate court judges, not for the creation of five
autonomous courts.
2. Legislative View of the Structure of the Appellate Court
Thus, from the perspective of the 1962 constitutional revision, the 1970
Constitution, and the supreme court rules promulgated thereunder, only
one appellate court, divided for administrative convenience, exists in Illinois.
The relevant statutes, however, do not provide such a clear perspective. For
example, in establishing the number of appellate judges to be selected from
each judicial district, 4 6 the General Assembly in 1963 chose to amend,
rather than to repeal, the 1877 Act to Establish Appellate Courts. It retained
the title (with its plural form of appellate court) and used language unfortunately reminiscent of the old Act: "An appellate court is established in each
47
of the 5 judicial districts as such districts are determined by law."
The quoted sentence, gratuitously reestablishing the constitutionally-established appellate court, might be interpreted to indicate either: (1) that one
appellate court was established to sit in the five judicial districts of the state;
or (2) that five appellate courts were established, each of which was to be
located in one of the judicial districts. The rest of the 1963 statute, enacted
in preparation for the effective date of the 1962 revision of the judiciary
article, used phrases in reference to "the appellate court" that would indi48
cate a legislative position that but one appellate court was established.

45. Id. at 22(e), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, § 22(e).
46. The constitution provides that the number of appellate judges to be selected from each
judicial district shall be "provided by law." ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1962, amended 1970).
47. Act to Amend the Amended Act to Establish Appellate Courts, 1963 II1. Laws, § 1, at
2643. The statute went on to establish the number of appellate judges to be selected from each
judicial district. This statute, now ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 25 (1977), currently provides for
the election of eighteen appellate judges in the first district, and four in the other districts. The
additional judges sitting pursuant to assignment by the supreme court brings the totals to
twenty judges sitting in the five divisions of the first district, six judges sitting in the two
divisions of the second district, five in the third district, five in the fourth district, and five in
the fifth district. Directory Supreme and Appellate Courts State of Illinois, 62 I11.
App. 3d v-vii
(1978).
48. E.g.:
The Supreme Court may assign additional judges to service in the appellate court
from time to time as the business of the appellate court requires. . . .Assignments
to divisions shall be made by the Supreme Court and a judge may be assigned to a
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On the other hand, sections of the statutes referring, for example, to
"clerks of the appellate courts" 49 and writs of mandamus that may be issued
by "said appellate courts respectively," 50 arguably indicate a legislative belief that several appellate courts still exist in Illinois. One may observe that
the statutes passed after the 1962 revision of the judiciary article tend to
refer to the appellate court, singular (and often capitalized), and those carried over fiom before that revision often retain the plural (and uncapitalized)
reference.51
In summary, repairing to the statutes for an indication of whether the
appellate court is unitary or multiple is unrewarding. The constitution, and
the supreme court through its rules, have clearly created, structured, and
recognized one appellate court in Illinois. Only from grammatical minutiae
could one argue that legislation even attempts to fragmentize this structure.
3. Judicial Opinions Since 1964
Despite this constitutional and judicial recognition that a single appellate
court exists in Illinois, panels of judges inevitably found themselves in disdigreement with their brethren sitting in other divisions. The MedendorpBandy rule has survived the revision of the judicial article, effective in 1964,
52
as the method of dealing with these disagreements on substantive law.
a. The Medendorp Branch of the Rule-Vertical Stare Decisis
The 1964 unification of the appellate court should have fortified the vertical stare decisis established by Hughes v. Medendorp. 53 However, the doctrine has not been scrutinized in light of the revised judiciary article, although the supreme court has commented on the doctrine in passing, and
the appellate court has grappled with it in some sticky situations.
(1) Supreme Court Treatment of Vertical Stare Decisis
The Supreme Court of Illinois recognized the existence of the Medendorp
The case involved a con-

branch of the rule in UMW Hospital v. UMW. 54

division in a district other than the district in which such judge resides. The organization of the appellate court and its divisions shall be prescribed by rule of the
Supreme Court.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 25 (1977) (emphasis added). See also similar use of "the appellate
court" as a unitary reference in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 32.1 and 32.2 (1977), relating to
appeals, respectively to and from, the appellate court.
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 27 (1977).
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 35 (1977).
51. See notes 47-50 supra.
52. See discussion in Part 1. B of text.
53. 294 Il. App. 424, 13 N.E.2d 1015 (3d Dist. 1938). See notes 24-28 and accompanying
text supra.
54. 52 Ill. 2d 496, 288 N.E.2d 455 (1972).
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tempt order issued for the violation of a temporary restraining order. The
propriety of the trial court's issuance of the contempt order and levy of fines
upon the defendants hinged upon whether it had properly ascertained the
law as it existed at the time of the issuance of the restraining order. On the
day of the finding of contempt by the circuit court sitting in the fifth district,
the supreme court reversed a decision of the' first district appellate court,
which had held that the peaceful striking and picketing of a not-for-profit
hospital was against public policy and thus exempt from the Anti-Injunction
Act.
The trial court had relied upon a decision of the first district in issuing the
temporary restraining order, and on appeal to the supreme court the defendants contended that, based upon the supreme court's decision overruling
the first district case, the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the restraining order, that under such circumstances the order was void, and that a
refusal to obey a void order could not serve as the basis for a contempt
judgment. The supreme court, however, citing Medendorp, ruled that at the
time of the issuance of the restraining order, the trial court sitting in the
fifth district was bound by the decision of the appellate court sitting in the
first district: "So far as we have ascertained, the . . . opinion [of the appellate court sitting in the first district] stated the law then applicable to the
facts of this case and was binding upon the trial court."55
The Supreme Court of Illinois mentioned the precedential effect of an
appellate decision on only one other occasion; once again it affirmed the
viability of the Medendorp rule, this time without citing it specifically. The
opportunity to discuss the stare decisis issue arose out of a conflict between
divisions sitting in the first and third districts. The substantive issue was
whether recipients of nonprobate assets-specifically, persons who held
property in joint tenancy with the deceased-might be required to share
proportionately in paying federal estate taxes.
The first district had held, in In re Estate of Van Duser, that absent decedent's expressed intention to the contrary, the equitable contribution doctrine must be utilized so that nonprobate assets bear a portion of the federal
estate tax burden.5 6 The third district, however, disagreed. The trial court
in Roe v. Estate of Farrel157 had followed the Van Duser decision, and
although the third district acknowledged that the circuit judge had acted
properly, it nevertheless reversed his decision because it was "unpersuaded
by the conclusions in Van Duser .... ."58 Apparently, the supreme court
perceived Roe as the proper case in which to resolve the substantive conflict
between the first and third districts, and granted leave to appeal in the face

55. Id. at 499, 288 N.E.2d at 457 (emphasis added).
56. 19 I11. App. 3d 1022, 313 N.E.2d 228 (1st Dist. 1974).
57. 42 Ill. App. 3d 705, 356 N.E.2d 344 (3d Dist. 1976).
58. 42 Ill. App. 3d 705, 708, 356 N.E.2d 344, 347 (3d Dist. 1974), rev'd, 69 Ill. 2d 525, 372
N.E.2d 662 (1978).
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of the third district's denial of a certificate of importance. 59 The court
seemed to agree with the third district's acknowledgement of the propriety
of the trial court's adherence to the first district decision. 60 The validity of
the Medendorp rule holding all trial courts bound by a decision of the
appellate court, regardless of district, was thereby supported. The supreme
court found Van Duser to be the more sound of the two appellate court
decisions, and therefore reversed the third district's decision in Roe.
The supreme court has said precious little about the binding effect of appellate court decisions: its only comments on the concept since the 1964
appellate court unification have come in UMW Hospital and Roe. Further,
what has been said was limited to an affirmation of the Medendorp principle.
In UMW Hospital, the court recognized that the trial court had acted properly in following a decision of another district even though the law followed
turned out to be "bad" law. In Roe, the court's affirmation of the Medendorp
principle was somewhat weaker, in that the law followed by the trial court
was ultimately found to be the correct position. From its failure to address
the issue comprehensively when the opportunity presented itself, 61 it can be
surmised that the Supreme Court of Illinois has been content to leave the
determination of the stare decisis effect of appellate court decisions to the
appellate court itself.
(2) Appellate Court Treatment of Vertical Stare Decisis
(a) The Garcia Story: Geographical Stare Decisis
The most extensive look at the stare decisis effect of appellate court decisions in Illinois to date was taken by the third district appellate court in
Garcia v. Hynes & Howes Real Estate, Inc. 62 The question was whether an
implied warranty of habitability exists in a contract for the sale of a new
home built by the seller. The contract for sale was signed by the Garcias in
1970, a time when there were conflicting decisions within the appellate
court. In 1962, the first district, in Weck v. A:M Sunrise Construction Co. ,63

59. An appeal to the supreme court lies as a matter of right in a case decided by the
appellate court upon certification by the appellate court that the case involves a question of such
importance that it should be decided by the supreme court. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4(c): Ill.
Sup. Ct. R. 316, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 316 (1977). Judge Alloy, dissenting in Roe at the
appellate level, 42 I11. App. 3d 705, 709, 356 N.E.2d 344, 348, believed the issue was of such
significance. However, the appellate court denied the certification. 356 N.E.2d at 344. Fortunately, the supreme court chose to grant discretionary review, under Sup. Ct. R. 315(a), ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 315(a) (1977).
60. The court stated: "The circuit court under the circumstances could properly invoke the
holding in In re Estate of Van Duser." 69 111. 2d 525, 532, 372 N.E.2d 662, 665 (1978). Yet one

wonders, does "under the circumstances" imply that had Van Duser ultimately turned out to be
bad law, the trial court would not be deemed to have invoked its authority properly?
61. More likely, the attorneys failed to press the matter.
62. 29 I11. App. 3d 479, 331 N.E.2d 634 (3d Dist. 1975).
63. 36 I11.App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1st Dist. 1962).
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had held that an implied warranty inhered in that type of contract. In the
following year, the third district, finding in Coutrakon v. Adams that it was
"not constrained to follow" the first district, refused to recognize that
implied warranty. 64 At the time of the Coutrakon decision, Rock Island
County, the place at which the Garcia trial court sat, was within the boundaries of the second district. Thus, the trial court in Garcia was not bound
geographically by either Coutrakon or Weck.
The matter was further complicated by the 1972 decision in Hanavan v.
Dye, 65 rendered by the appellate court sitting in a reconstituted third district that now included Rock Island County. Hanavan followed Weck and
established the implied warranty in the third district. However, the trial
court in the Garcia case ruled Hanavan inapplicable to the facts presented,
because the Garcias' contract had been signed prior to the date of the Hanavan decision.
Under the circumstances as they appeared to the circuit court in Garcia,
there was a conflict among the districts on the question of whether an implied warranty existed in Illinois, with no decision of an appellate court establishing the law in the district in which the trial court sat. Regarding the
"uncertainty as to the applicable rule," the third district restated: "The opinions of any appellate court necessarily are binding on all circuit courts across
the State, but not on the other branches of the appellate court ...."66 The
platitude was not responsive to the trial court's dilemma. But the appellate
court went on to state its belief that the precedent of Weck, sustained in
Hanavan, established that a warranty of habitability had been recognized at
least since 196267 and that therefore its decision in Hanavan was applicable
retroactively. The Garcia trial court was therefore bound to follow that case.

In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the argument that, where a
conflict exists among the appellate districts, a trial court may choose the law
it believes to be correct:
While defendant contends that the trial court may reach its own conclusion in a given situation where there may be an isolated appellate court
opinion from another district which supports a contrary conclusion, we do
not believe that principle would be applicable here. Since Week was in
force and effect since 1962, there were no overruling decisions involved.
To apply the principle of optional selectivity by a trial court in such situation could create an anomalous situation where the trial court one week
would follow one principle and the following week, a contrary principle .... A trial court, located in an appellate district where a conclusion

64. 39 111.
App. 2d 290, 302, 188 N.E.2d 780, 786 (3d Dist. 1963), aff'd on other grounds,
31 I1l. 2d 189, 201 N.E.2d 100 (1964), by a supreme court that found the question "interesting"
but not necessary to its affirmance. Id. at 190, 201 N.E.2d at 101.
65. 4 I11.
App. 3(d576, 281 N.E.2d 398 (3(l Dist. 1972).
66. Garcia v. Hwiies & Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 11. App. 3d 479, 481, 331 N.E.2d 634,
636 (3d Dist. 1975).
67. Id.
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on an issue is reached, should adhere to that conclusion and not to one
promulgated in another district.68

As was previously indicated, prior to the 1964 redistricting necessitated by
the 1962 revision of the judiciary amendment, Rock Island County was not
within the boundaries of the third district. Therefore, the Garcia appellate
court concluded that it was not bound by the decision in Coutrakon, which
was an appellate court opinion out of the old third district. Subsequent to
the redistricting, the appellate court, sitting in the new third district comprising Rock Island and other counties, decided in Hanavan that there was
an implied warranty, and thus bound the trial court in Rock Island County.
What then was the effect of Hanavan (new third district: implied warranty
exists) upon Coutrakon (old third district: no implied warranty)? The Garcia
court, which had decided Hanavan, said Hanavan "did not overrule prior
law other than in the sense that it concurred in the original appellate court
decision in Weck and rejected the conclusion in Coutrakon." 9 "Rejected"
in context, implies that the Hanavan court merely found Coutrakon to be
unpersuasive rather than that it overruled Coutrakon. But in the four counties that were within the old third district when Coutrakon was decided, and
are now in the new third district where the Hanavan court sat, Hanavan
must have overruled Coutrakon.70 The Garcia opinion might have meant
that in the remaining counties of the old third district, Coutrakon was not
overruled by Hanavan.71
Interstices of the Garcia story occurred meanwhile in the fifth, fourth, and
second districts. In 1964, in Narup v. Higgins, 72 the appellate court sitting
in the fifth district had decided that there was no implied warranty of fitness
in the sale of a new house. 73 However, because the opinion was unpublished, it did not receive immediate state-wide attention. 74 In 1969, the

68. Id. at 482, 331 N.E.2d at.636 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 480, 331 N.E.2d at 635.
70. These four counties are Hancock, McDonough, Fulton, and Tazewell. The court in

Garcia twice emphasized that Rock Island County, where the Garcia trial court sat, was now
within the borders of the old third district. Id. at 480-481, 331 N.E.2d at 635-636.
71. Most of these counties are now in the fourth district; three of them are in the fifth
district. In the latter three counties, Coutrakon might well have been the law, on the basis of
Narup v. Higgins, 51 I11. App. 2d 102, 200 N.E.2d 922 (5th Dist. 1964), discussed in text
accompanying note 72 infra. As for the other old third district counties, now in the fourth
district, when Conyers v. Molloy, 50 I11.App. 3d 17, 364 N.E.2d 986 (4th Dist. 1977), aligned
the fourth district with the divisions that had accepted the implied warranty, Coutrakon would
have then been overruled.
72. 51 111. App. 2d 102, 200 N.E.2d 922 (5th Dist. 1964).
73. Judge Reynolds, who had concurred in the Coutrakon decision, now sat in the fifth
district.
74. From the perspective of the ordinary lawyer reading the reporters it is difficult to discern the holding in Narup. The official reporter contains no opinion, only the notation, "Not to
be published in full." The headnote in the official reporter offers no clue that implied warranty

was even in issue in the case. Narup v. Higgins, 51 111. App. 2d 102 (5th Dist. 1964). However,
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second district avoided the implied warranty fray by deciding the case of
Ehard v. Pistakee Builders, Inc. 75 on grounds other than the implied warranty theory, and finding an express agreement to correct defects. It agreed,
not surprisingly, that "some clarification on the point is needed in Illinois." 76 Finally, in 1977 the fourth district, in Conyers v. Molloy,77 ruled
in favor of the implied warranty.
The conflict among the districts persisted until 1979, when the Garcia
saga was wrapped up on the substantive issue, but not on the stare decisis
problems under consideration. The first opportunity for the supreme court

the North Eastern Reporter's key number headnote says: "There is no implied warranty of
condition or quality in sale of new house or one in process of construction." 200 N.E.2d 922,
923. Narup was not mentioned in the Garcia opinion, and this omission may have been within
the spirit of Uniform Appellate Rule 8, providing that opinions of the Illinois Appellate Court
which have been published in abstract form only, shall not be cited in the briefs of litigants
unless the entire text is appended. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 908 (1977). In Conyers v.
Molloy, 50 I11.App. 3d 17, 364 N.E.2d 986 (4th Dist. 1977), the fourth district cited Narup as
holding against the warranty. Id. at 19, 364 N.E.2d at 988. Indeed, the unpublished opinion in
Narup, furnished the authors by the clerk for the fifth district, reveals the holding in the case to
be: "There is no implied warranty of condition or quality in the sale of a new house, or one in
the process of construction." Narup v. Higgins, No. 64-F-32, Slip op. at 7 (App. Ct. 5th Dist.
Aug. 17, 1964). Why the Narup opinion, clearly on an issue of importance, was not published is
a matter on which the authors do not speculate. A statute then in effect imposed a duty on the
appellate court to designate which of its decisions should be published in full and which published by abstract, but further provided for publication in condensed form or by abstract if the
appellate court failed to make the designation. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 66 (1963). See generally Report of the Committee on Use of Appellate Court Energies of the Advisory Council for
Appellate Justice, Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions (Aug. 1973).
75. 111 I11.App. 2d 227, 250 N.E.2d 1 (2d Dist. 1969).
76. Id. at 232, 250 N.E.2d at 3.
77. 50 I11.App. 3d 17, 364 N.E.2d 986 (4th Dist. 1977).
The third district had followed its Hanavan-Garciaposition in Elmore v. Blume, 31 111. App.
3d 643, 334 N.E.2d 431 (3d Dist. 1975), and the first district struggled with detailing the
content of the warranty in dicta in Goggin v. Fox Valley Constr. Corp., 48 I11.App. 3d 103, 365
N.E. 2d 509 (1st Dist. 1977).
Thus the warranty existed in the first, third, and fourth districts; it did not exist in the fifth,
and the second had not decided the question. See generally Roeser, The Implied Warranty of
Habitability in the Sale of New Housing: The Trend in Illinois, 1978 S. ILL. U.L.J. 178.
This study has not undertaken an enumeration of all the substantive areas, major and minor,
in which the divisions of the appellate court are at odds. There are, however, examples other
than the implied warranty in new house sales, well known to the bar. One example of major
importance is whether a landlord has a general duty to mitigate damages upon the abandonment
of the leasehold by a tenant. Compare Wohl v. Yelen, 22 111. App. 2d 455, 161 N.E.2d 339 (1st
Dist. 1959) (landlord has duty to mitigate damages) and cases cited therein, with Reget v.
Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 96 Ill. App. 2d 278, 238 N.E.2d 418 (5th Dist. 1968) (landlord has no
duty to mitigate damages). The conflict was still recognized in Wanderer v. Plainfield Carton
Corp., 40 I11.App. 3d 552, 351 N.E.2d 630 (3d Dist. 1976), and the authors have found no
decision resolving it. Another example of conflict is whether the Jack Spring implied warranty
of habitability of leasehold premises, 50 I11.2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972), may be used affirmatively by a tenant, Gillette v. Anderson, 4 I11.App. 3d 838, 282 N.E.2d 149 (2d Dist. 1972), or
merely defensively, Trice v. Chicago Housing Auth., 14 III. App. 3d 97, 103, 302 N.E.2d 207,
211 (1st Dist. 1973) (special concurring opinion of Judge Hayes).
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to set precedent for the state in this important area where litigation recurs
presented itself early-in the Coutrakon case in 1964-but the court declined the invitation. 78 After fifteen years of conflict, the supreme court
took the next opportunity to decide the issue, and ruled, in Petersen v.
Hubschman Construction Co., 79 in favor of the implied warranty. However,
the court did not address the issue of precedent within the appellate court.
It merely noted, without perceptible signs of discomfort, that the results of
the decisions of the "appellate courts of this state ... have not been uniform." 80

(b) Thorpe: Temporal Stare Decisis
If conflicts within the appellate court placed the trial judge in Garcia in a
-quandary about which decision to follow, they placed the appellate court in
People v. Thorpe81 in a quandary about which decision the trial court presumably followed. The substantive issue was the standard of proof constitutionally required for civil commitment under the Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act. 82 The trial court, sitting in the second district, had made no
reference to the standard of proof it followed in the non-jury proceeding
culminating in the judgment on November 26, 1975, that Thorpe was a sexually
dangerous person. However, because there was evidence in the record to
establish the statutory elements beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment
would be affirmed unless the defendant could sustain his burden of showing
that the trial court followed an erroneous standard of proof.
In 1974, the appellate court sitting in the first district had decided that
the reasonable doubt standard did apply in People v. Penibrock.83 The
state's petition for leave to appeal the Pembrock decision was granted by the
supreme court. Before the supreme court ruled, the appellate court sitting
in the fourth district held, in People v. Oliver (filed October 16, 1975), that a
preponderance of the evidence was the appropriate standard of proof. 84
After the judgment in Thorpe, but before it was reviewed by the second
district, the supreme court decided the Penibrock appeal and resolved the
conflict in favor of the reasonable doubt standard. 8 5 The appellate court in

78. See note 64 supra.
79. 76 111. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979).
80. Id. at 38, 389 N.E.2d at 1157. The Petersen case came to the supreme court from the second
district (53 II1. App. 3d 626, 368 N.E.2d 1044 (2d Dist. 1977)). However, the appellate court
did not address the issue of implied warranty but rather decided the case on alternative contract
issues.
81. 52 I11.App. 3d 576, 367 N.E.2d 960 (2d Dist. 1977).
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 105-1.01 (1977).

83. 23 I11.App. 3d 991, 320 N.E.2d 470 (1st Dist. 1974), aff'd, 62 I11.2dt 317, 342 N.E.2d
28 (1976).
84. 32 Ill. App. 3d 772, 336 N.E.2d 586 (4th Dist. 1975). Judge Trapp dissented "for the
reasons stated in People v. Pembrock .... which holds that an individual must be proven to be
a sexually dangerous person beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 779, 336 N.E.2d at 591.
85. People v. Pembrock, 62 I11. 2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976).
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Thorpe then rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court erroneously followed the preponderance standard of Oliver.
Apparently Oliver's binding authority on the trial court would have derived from its being the later in time of the two conflicting decisions of the
appellate division, neither of which sat in the district embracing the trial
court. 86 Presuming that the trial court had followed the correct, reasonable
doubt standard of the earlier first district decision in Pembrock, there were
two cogent reasons for rejecting the defendant's argument. First, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had ruled prior to the hearing in Thorpe that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was constitutionally required for commitment as a sexually dangerous person. 8 7 That ruling would
have particularly alerted a trial judge to the danger of applying a lower standard of proof because the federal action was for habeas corpus relief with the
practical effect (although not binding precedent in Illinois courts) that a defendant could have secured his release if committed under a preponderance
standard. Second, the fourth district Oliver opinion, upholding the preponderance standard, was filed a month before the trial court commitment of
Thorpe, but it did not appear in advance publication form until fourteen
days after the trial court's decision. In a practical sense, it was highly unlikely that the trial court would have been aware of Oliver.
Although it was unnecessary for the court, under the circumstances, fully
to consider a rule that would give temporal guidelines to a trial judge faced
with conflicting appellate decisions from districts other than his own, the
Thorpe court did glance in that direction. Absent the special circumstances
present in Thorpe, which are unlikely to recur, it will be necessary in the
future for the appellate court to come to grips with the arguments for temporal guidelines.
Thus, the supreme court and appellate decisions since the 1964 unification
of the appellate court have reaffirmed the pre-1964 principle that all trial
courts in the state are bound by decisions of the appellate court. It can be
seen from Garcia and Thorpe that the Medendorp principle of vertical stare
decisis is easier stated than applied where decisions of divisions of the appellate court do not bind each other.
b. The Bandy Branch of the Rule-No Horizontal
Stare Decisis: Effect of Denial of Leave to Appeal
Whereas the 1964 unification of the appellate court should have fortified
the vertical stare decisis established by Medendorp, it should have cast
doubt on the lack of horizontal stare decisis established by Hughes v.

86. See generally People v. Thorpe, 52 Ill. App. 3d 576, 367 N.E.2d 960 (2d Dist. 1977),
Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 2.
87. United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 947 (1976).
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Bandy. 88 Recall that in 1949, when Bandy was decided under the constitution of 1870, there were four legislatively established appellate courts. Yet,
after the 1964 restructuring of the judicial system to effectuate the unification of the Appellate Court of Illinois, the Bandy rule of no stare decisis
effect of a decision of one division upon another persisted. 8 9 Once again,
the doctrine has not been scrutinized by any court in light of the revision of
the judiciary article, and has not been commented upon at all by the supreme court.
The appellate court, while refusing to defer directly to a decision of a
coordinate division, has seemingly searched for a way to raise a coordinate
decision out of the horizontal plane and accord it the effect of a supreme
court decision. The supreme court's denial of leave to appeal has been the
vehicle by which such a decision is elevated and then followed, thereby
achieving the benefits of horizontal stare decisis without the necessity of
bowing to a coordinate division. The post-1964 forays into ascribing precedent to the denial of leave to appeal are a continuation of the quest for
precedent absent the horizontal deference that began when Illinois had four
appellate courts. Our study will detour briefly from the rejection of horizontal stare decisis since 1964, and will explore the soundness of this device of
creating vertical stare decisis between the supreme court and the appellate
court.
In Corbett v. Devon Bank, 90 the first district ruled that where the supreme court had denied leave to appeal a prior decision of a coordinate appellate division, such stature was added to that decision that it would be followed. The first district recognized that denial of leave to appeal by the
supreme court is "not precisely equivalent" to a decision by that court. 91
But it reasoned that under supreme court rule 315(a), the denial of leave to
appeal "means necessarily that the Supreme Court has scrutinized" the deci92
sion and the record below and has approved that decision.
The court's reliance on supreme court rule 315(a) for the proposition that
the supreme court has scrutinized the decision of the appellate court and
reviewed the record, and has therefore approved of the result of the appellate court decision, is unfounded. Under that rule, 93 a petition might be
88. 336 Ill. App. 472, 84 N.E.2d 664 (3d Dist. 1949), affd on substantive issue, 404 111.74,
87 N.E.2d 855 (1949).

89. Roe v. Estate of Farrell, 42 Ill. App. 3d 705, 356 N.E.2d 344 (3d Dist. 1976), rev'd on
substantive issue, 69 I11.2d 525, 372 N.E.2d 662 (1978); Garcia v. Hynes & Howes Real Estate,
Inc., 29 I11.App. 3d 479, 481, 331 N.E.2d 634, 636 (3d Dist. 1975). See also Roby v. Illinois
Founders Ins. Co., 57 I11. App. 3d 89, 372 N.E.2d 1097 (1st Dist. 1978); Corbett v. Devon

Bank, 12 Ill. App. 3d 559, 299 N.E.2d 521 (1st Dist. 1973).
90. 12 Ill. App. 3d 559, 299 N.E.2d 521 (1st Dist. 1973). See Stinson v. Edlen, 27 Ill. App.
2d 425, 169 N.E.2d 682 (3d Dist. 1960).
91. Corbett v. Devon Bank, 12 Ill. App. 3d 559, 567, 299 N.E.2d 521, 526 (1st Dist. 1973).
92. Id.
93. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 315(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 A, § 315(a), provides:

Whether such a petition [for leave to appeal] will be granted is a matter of sound
judicial discretion. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the
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denied because the supreme court considered the case of insufficient importance to warrant expenditures of its resources, or for reasons other than a
belief that the appellate court had reached the correct decision or result.
Corbett's reliance upon McCann ex rel. Osterman v. Continental Casualty
Co. 94 was similarly misplaced. The McCann court had refused to follow the
decision of the appellate court, in which leave to appeal had been denied,
because it could find no definitive determination of the question presented
to it merely from the circumstances of the supreme court's denial of leave to

appeal. 95

court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered: the
general importance of the question presented; the existence of a conflict between
the decision sought to be reviewed and a decision of the Supreme Court, or of
another division of the Appellate Court; the need for the exercise of the Supreme
Court's supervisory authority; and the final or interlocutory character of the judgment sought to be reviewed.
94. 6 I11.App. 2d 527, 128 N.E.2d 624 (1st Dist. 1955).
95. However, McCann did state, as did Corbett (12 I11.App. 3d at 567, 299 N.E.2d at 526),
that the denial of leave to appeal is "merely an approval of the decision," though not necessarily
an approval of the reasons therefor. 6 Ill. App. 2d at 534-535, 128 N.E.2d at 627-628.
The three cases relied on by McCann do not support even that conclusion. The first, Bartosik
v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 266 IU. App. 28 (1st Dist. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 609
(1932), involved an argument that the appellate court was compelled to follow a prior appellate
case in which certiorari had been denied by the Supreme Court of the United States. The court
rather cautiously accepted this argument: "We are aware that [the denial of certiorari] does not
mean that the court approved of the opinion. . . . [B]ut it does mean that the decision in [that]
case was approved and we know of no reason why a different decision should be reached upon a
state of facts which cannot be distinguished upon any material point." Id. at 41. This position is
clearly wrong. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950), quoted
from in text at note 97 infra.
The McCann court also relied on Marks v. Pope, 289 I11.App. 558, 7 N.E.2d 481 (1st Dist.
1937), wherein appellee asserted that the court was bound by a decision of a coordinate branch
of the appellate court by reason of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the prior case.
However, the Marks court rejected the argument. Clearly, Marks does not support the proposition of the Corbett court that a denial of a petition for leave to appeal by the Supreme Court of
Illinois "adds to the stature and to the effect of a decision of the appellate court," 12 Ill. App.
3d at 567, 299 N.E.2d at 526.
Finally, McCann cited the case of Kelly v. Retirement Board, 292 I11.App. 390, 11 N.E.2d
220 (1st Dist. 1937). However, in that case, as in McCann itself, the court chose not to follow
the decision of the appellate court to which the appellant claimed that the court was bDund by
reason of the supreme court's denial of leave to appeal. The Kelly court concluded that the
supreme court's denial of the petition could have been wholly based on an issue other than the
one currently before the court.
It thus seems that the conclusion reached by the Corbett court was unfounded. Although the
statement was not relied upon by the Corbett court, the supreme court has said: "The denial of
leave to appeal . . . attests that this court thought the result was correct and proper under the
facts there presented." Walters v. Walters, 409 I11.298, 305, 99 N.E.2d 342, 346 (1951). However, in making this statement, the court preceded the quoted language with the following
statement: "A denial of leave to appeal is merely authority for the correctness of the result
reached and in no way adopts or certifies to the language stated in the opinion." Id. These
words would require severe straining to attach the weight to a denial of leave to appeal implied
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It is worthy of note that the Illinois method for supreme court review by
leave to appeal is nearly identical to certiorari practice in the Supreme Court

even in the negative phrase "not precisely equivalent to a decision by that court," as was
asserted by the Corbett court. 12 Ill. App. 3d at 567, 299 N.E.2d at 526.
Additional support for the proposition that a denial of leave to appeal does not add to the
stature of an appellate court decision may be gleaned from the case of People ex rel. Hoyne v.
Grant, 208 Il. App. 235 (1st Dist. 1917), aff'd, 283 I11.391, 119 N.E. 344 (1918). Appellant in
that case argued that the appellate court was bound to follow a decision of another division of
the first district which had previously decided one of the key issues in the case. Under normal
circumstances the court would clearly not have been bound by the decision of its sister court, in
that at the time of decision, the section 17 sentence denied appellate court decisions any precedential value. See text accompanying footnotes 16-17 supra. However, appellant asserted that
because the supreme court had denied a writ of certiorari in the circuit case, the supreme court
had passed upon the merits of that case, and, by denying certiorari, had affirmed the conclusion
reached by the appellate court. To this argument, the appellate court responded:
This contention, in our judgment, involves an entire misconception of the purpose
and effect of the statutory provisions in regard to writs of certiorari. Those provisions are substatially identical with a section of the United States statute providing
for the issuance of writs of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals ....
The conditions which led to the enactment of the State statute were also substantially similar to those which brought about the provision for writs" of certiorari to
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals ....
It seems a conclusive answer . . . to say . . . there does not appear to be a case
in which counsel have suggested that the Supreme Court, by denying the writ of
certiorari, stamped the conclusions of the court of appeals with its approval, and
impliedly made a declaration in regard to what was the law. The language of the
statute does not require our Supreme Court to issue a writ of certiorari in any case,
but merely provides that it shall be competent for it to do so; nor does it require
the court to pass upon the merits of the controversy presented, but leaves that to
the discretion of the court, to be exercised in every case.
Id. at 239-41.
The first district also recognized that the supreme court may have denied the petition based
upon an issue or factor other than the conclusion the appellate court had reached on the issue
currently pressed by appellant:
Any inference, therefore, as to the opinion of the Supreme Court in regard to the
correctness of the conclusion reached by the Appellate Court must necessarily rest
upon speculation and conjecture. The function of finally declaring the law of the
State rests with its Supreme Court, and is accomplished by means of its opinions, in
which it speaks through its justices. The only safe rule would, therefore, appear to
be that its conclusions in regard to the law are to be found in its reported opinions,
and not decided inferentially from its action in denying writs of certiorari.
Id. at 242. Upon appeal, the supreme court spoke to the question of stare decisis -affect of an
appellate court case following a denial of certiorari:
One question not insisted on in this court but which was urged in the Appellate
Court and is extensively treated in the opinion of that court we think should be
referred to here. . . . The denial of the writ of certiorari . . . meant nothing more
than that we approved the conclusion of the Appellate Court . . . . It did not mean
that we approved the reasons set out in the opinion of that court and its determination of the merits of the case and of the rights of the parties . . ..
People ex rel. Hoyne v. Grant, 283 Ill. 391, 396-97, 119 N.E. 344, 346 (1918).
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of the United States for purposes of the point currently under discussion. 96
Denial of leave by one has no more meaning than denial of certiorari by the
other. In regard to the latter, hear Mr. Justice Frankfurter's admonition:
Inasimuch ... as all that a denial of a petition for writ of certiorari
means is that fewer than four members of the Court thought it should be
granted, this Court has rigorously insisted that such a denial carries with it
no implication whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits of a

case which it has declined to review. The Court has said this again and
97
again; again and again the admonition has to be repeated.

In conclusion, the Corbett position is wrong in light of the purpose, language, and history of rule 315(a); the authorities cited by the McCann decision on which Corbett relied; and the impracticalities of treating a denial of
leave to appeal as substantive authority. 98 However, the detour in this
study, to demonstrate that error, was not to disparage one appellate division's
following a decision of another division. To the contrary, this effort to raise a
coordinate decision to a higher pinnacle, as Sisyphus did the rock, is not
necessary or judicious. The appellate court could follow that decision merely
by according it the deference that it is due-horizontal stare decisis.
D. The Present: An Attempt at Application
Examination of the development of principles governing the stare decisis
effect of appellate court decisions is invaluable to an understanding of the
present status of those principles in Illinois. Under Medendorp, all inferior
courts in the state are bound by decisions of any of the ten divisions of the
appellate court. However, based on Bandy, no appellate court is bound to
follow a decision of another division, despite the fact that the Illinois constitution, supreme court rules, and relevant legislative authority prescribe
that there is but one appellate court in this state. On the other hand, if the
Corbett rule persists, an appellate court may submit to being bound by a
decision of a coordinate branch when the supreme court has denied leave to
appeal in a case embracing similar questions of law. Additionally, Garcia
establishes that appellate court decisions of the district in which a trial court
sits are of greater weight than those of "foreign" districts, and the Thorpe
situation suggests that the date of conflicting decisions may be a relevant
consideration where a trial court is bound to follow neither decision under
the Garcia rule, or perhaps more correctly, where it is bound to follow both
decisions under the Medendorp rule.
96. The committee comments to supreme court rule 315, "Leave to Appeal from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court," state: "The practice is similar to the certiorari procedure in
the United States Supreme Court, and the considerations are in the main the same, though
adopted to the needs of the state court." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 315 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
97. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J., respecting denial of petition for certiorari).
98. See discussion in note 95 supra.
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These cases, taken in the aggregate, indicate that a trial judge faced with a
question requiring the determination of the stare decisis effect of appellate
court decisions upon his court, may be presented with perplexing problems.
Consider the following situations:
(1) There may be an appellate case from a district other than that in which
the trialjudge sits, and no further authority on the point. In this situation,
the trial judge should have little difficulty determining the proper course of
action. There is but one decision of the Appellate Court of Illinois, and
under the Medendorp doctrine he is bound to follow that decision: "[Ain
opinion of the Appellate Court is binding authority . . . upon all inferior
courts in this State." 99
(2) There may be several appellate court decisions which are or are not in
conflict, and one such decision is from the appellate court in the district in
which the trial judge sits. Clearly, if there is no conflict among these decisions, the trial court should have no difficulty determining the applicable
rule. If, however, the decisions are in conflict, the Medendorp rule creates
problems; each decision binds all inferior courts in this state. Thus, conversely, each trial court may be said to be bound to follow the decisions of
all the district appellate courts. Under the circumstances presently posed,
the appellate court has resolved the difficulty of the trial court's position by
stating that where the appellate court sitting in the district in which the trial
court is located has reached a conclusion on an issue before the trial court,
the trial court should "adhere to that conclusion and not to one promulgated
in another district." 100
(3) There may be no decision of the appellate court in the district in which
the trial judge sits, but decisions in other districts which are in conflict.
Three possible guidelines could be established for the trial judge faced with
such a problem.
a. Follow the most recent appellate decision. Last in time prevails. He
would take this course only in the absence of the special circumstances that
occurred in Thorpe, which are not likely to recur. This guideline would
mean, in effect, that the latest decision of the appellate court overruled prior
conflicting decisions as to all trial courts in the state except in the district of
the prior conflicting decision.
b. Follow the earliest appellate decision. 10 ' First in time prevails. This
would mean that the later conflicting decision of the appellate court overrules the earlier decision only in the district of the later conflicting decision.
99. Hughes v. Medendorp, 294 I11. App. 424, 427-28, 13 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (3d Dist.
1938).
100. Garcia v. Hynes & Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 Ill. App. 3d 479, 482, 331 N.E.2d 634
(3d Dist. 1975); see also People v. Thorpe, 52 III. App. 3d 576, 376 N.E.2d 960, 963 (2d Dist.
1977) (dicta).
101. Accord, Sowell v. Sowell, 212 Ga. 351, 92 S.E.2d 524 (1956) ("Where there is conflict
existing in the decisions of this court, the correct rule must be determined from the earliest
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c. Reach his own conclusion as to which appellate decision to follow. It
may seem at first blush that the trial judge's chances of being affirmed would
be improved by this guideline. The trial judge usually knows the propensities or philosophies of appellate judges in his district, even when there is
no case on point. Yet in the first district, where twenty judges sit in the five
divisions, 10 2 the chances of correctly guessing which particular three judges
might review his decision are negligible. And even in the second, third,
fourth, or fifth districts, the trial judge would be second guessing as to five
or six judicial minds, any three of which might review the case.' 0 3
Moreover, if ultimate aflirmance were the goal of the trial judge, he would
follow whichever decision he thought the supreme court would approve.
This pick-and-choose approach seems to have been suggested in Garcia
and found not "applicable." The court's comment on that suggestion is interesting: "To apply the principle of optional selectivity by a trial court in
such situation could create an anomalous situation where the trial court one
week would follow one principle and the following week, a contrary
04
principle." 1
At present, there are no real guidelines to assist the trial judge in selecting the last in time, first in time, or pick-and-choose course of action where
conflicts exist in divisions sitting in districts other than his own.
(4) There may be conflicting decisions among the divisions of a district
where more than one division sits, or among the panels within any district.
By the authority of Garcia, the trial court in such a situation is bound by all
appellate court decisions within his district, a geographical guideline impossible to apply. There is no established temporal guideline and the pick-andchoose approach is of no practical value here, for the trial judge does not
know to which division or panel in the district his case will be assigned for
review if appeal is sought. 10 5 At any rate, for the great majority of trial
judges to whom precedent means something loftier than "how do I get affirmed," geographical and temporal guidelines make little jurisprudential
sense.
(5) There may be conflicting decisions among the districts, and the supreme
court has denied leave to appeal in one such case. Under Corbett, 0 6 a prindecisions on the subject, and unless overruled, they are controlling." 1d. at 353, 92 S.E.2d at
526); Richmond County v. Sibert, 105 Ga. App. 581, 125 S.E.2d 129 (1962) ("[Tlhe Court of
Appeals is bound by the principles enunciated by the oldest Supreme Court decision, and not
by the latest expression of the Supreme Court which does not overrule, modify', or distinguish
its oldest case." id. at 582, 125 S.E.2d at 131).
102. See note 47 supra.
103. Id.
104. Garcia v. Hynes & Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 111.App. 3d 479, 482, 331 N.E.2d 634,
636 (3d Dist. 1975); see text at note 68 supra.
105. E.g., Rule 2, Rules of the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
IOA, § 802(d) (1977). For a discussion of several such situations which have arisen see,
AFTERWORD of text, at 605.
106. 12 111.
App. 3d 559, 299 N.E.2d 521 (1st Dist. 1973).
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ciple established in a case in which the supreme court has denied leave to
appeal prevails regardless of the precedential value of other decisions as determined by the "guidelines" just discussed. The magnitude of the dilemma
presented to a trial judge attempting to apply Corbett, in addition to the
inherent difficulty he faces in determining just what the denial of leave to
appeal means, 10 7 can be illustrated by an example. Suppose in case X the
appellate court sitting in the first district has adopted a certain principle of
law. No leave to appeal is sought. The second district subsequently rejects
this principle in case Y, and the supreme court denies leave to appeal case
Y. Thereafter, a trial judge sitting in the first district deciding analogous case
Z might follow Corbett, and view case Y as precedent on the strength of the
denial of leave to appeal. On the other hand, the trial judge might believe
that the Garcia rule commands that he follow case X, since he sits in the
geographical district of the appellate division that decided case X. Or,
moreover, he might believe that the case later in time, case Y, should prevail.
If this situation seems a stare decisis nightmare, it is hardly more so than
Garcia, or for that matter, Thorpe. It illustrates not so much a gap in the
Illinois approach, as a failure of appellate courts-supreme and
intermediate-to appreciate the problems faced by trial judges attempting
to apply the glib and sometimes inconsistent rules of stare decisis as enunciated in Illinois. A retreat from the Bandy rule of no horizontal stare decisis
would inevitably solve most of the problems of vertical stare decisis, so that
trial courts would have fewer gaps and more precedential guidelines. It is
somewhat surprising that the rule of Bandy, based on the 1877-1964 structure of multiple appellate courts, survived. As yet, it has not been
reexamined by any court in view of the unitary structure of the appellate
court established by the constitutional revision of the judicial system. How
the retreat from the Bandy rule should come to pass is addressed in part II.

II. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES AND RECOMMENDATION

If the Illinois approach to stare decisis within and among the appellate
court and circuit courts has proved less than completely satisfactory, it is not
because the Illinois judicial system lacks structural soundness.' 08 On the
contrary, the 1962 judicial article was
the culmination of many years of education and effort ....

The result has

been a complete reorganization of [the] entire judicial system in Illinois,

with the establishment of an adequate systeni of administrative control. It

107. See text at notes 90-98 supra.
108. See excerpts of accolades on the subject of the judiciary article reform of 1962, collected
in H. FINS, ILLINOIS APPELLATE PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION 28, I. 7 (1973).
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has generally been hailed as a landmark achievement in needed judicial
reform throughout the United States.' 09
Since the legislature repealed the section 17 "no binding effect" sentence,
the Supreme Court of Illinois has had little to say about the stare decisis
effect of decisions of appellate courts. The two supreme court references, in
UMW Hospital110 and Roe,"' support what we have denominated the vertical or umbrella stare decisis effect of a decision of the appellate court. The
rather limited aspect where improvement is needed is on the horizontal
plane. Because the various divisions of the appellate court do not view
themselves as bound by each other, the trial courts are necessarily in a
quandary when conflicts arise.
Examination and criticism of the alternative approaches to stare decisis,
sketched in the introduction to this study, are useful before recommending
refinements in the Illinois approach.
A. Evaluation of Alternative Approaches
1. Precedentless Appellate Court Decisions
The precedentless approach to decisions of intermediate appellate courts
assumes that the function of those decisions is simply to assure justice in the
particular case, "like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency." 112 There is no precedential value in
the decisions, either vertically on lower courts, or horizontally on the other
intermediate appellate courts, or even on the deciding court itself should the
same issue be presented in a subsequent case. 1 13 In summary, under this
theory, decisions of intermediate appellate courts are given no stare decisis
effect at all.
The Oklahoma judicial system serves well to demonstrate this approach.
Under the Oklahoma constitution, there is a legislatively established Court
of Appeals of the State of Oklahoma, which sits in two divisions. 1 14 The
unique feature of the Oklahoma system derives from the statute providing
that opinions of the court of appeals are not binding, and may not be cited
as precedent unless a majority of the justices of the supreme court approves
the opinion for publication in the official reporter. 115 Thus, under this ap-

109. Romiti v. Kerner, 256 F. Supp. 35, 39 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (Judge John S. Hastings, former
chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, speaking for a three
judge district court) (footnote omitted).
110. 52 I11.2d 496, 288 N.E.2d 455 (1972).
111. 69 Ill. 2d 525, 372 N.E.2d 662 (1978).

112. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). On Kadi
(Khadi) justice, see generally M. WEBER, ON LAw IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 351 (1954).
113. This situation prevails absent a binding decision by the supreme or high court on the
issue.
114. OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 1; OKLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 20, §§ 30.1, 30.2 (West 1977 Supp.).

115. OKLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 20, § 30.5 (West Supp. 1977). Opinions of the Court of Appeals
of the State of Oklahoma are not precedent and do not announce principles of state law that
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proach, the intermediate appellate court plays no role in building a cohesive
body of prescriptive law in the judicial system. That leaves the supreme
court as the only authoritative judicial institution to perform that task.

The precedentless intermediate court approach, negating as it does an\,
institutional or stare decisis function at the middle level, may be suited to a
judicial system where the volume of litigation is low, the geographical jurisdiction is homogeneous, or the work load of the high court allows it to give
ample attention to the institutional function of resolving conflicts. However,
the precedentless approach was tested in Illinois from 1877 to 1935, and
then repudiated by the repeal of the legislation that had denied binding
effect to appellate court decisions. 1 16 With the unitary appellate court
structure adopted in 1962, Illinois moved even further from the precedentless approach. Finding no beneficial application of that approach to Illinois,
it is discussed merely to emphasize that whatever hangover lingers from it
should be physicked.
2. Geographical or TerritorialApproach to Stare Decisis

Where there is more than one intermediate appellate court in the judicial
structure it is not illogical that the decisions of those courts lack horizontal
stare decisis effect and have vertical stare decisis only in the geographic area
in which the deciding court sits.
The federal judicial structure furnishes the most familiar example of the
geographical approach, with a United States Court of Appeals for each of the
eleven judicial circuits.117 It is well established that the decisions of the
eleven separate courts of appeals bind federal district courts (trial courts)
only in the circuit over which the respective court of appeals presides. 118
Thus, there is geographically limited vertical stare decisis. A decision of the
court of appeals for one circuit is merely persuasive authority when cited to

the court of appeals for another circuit; there is no horizontal stare decisis. 119

The incapacity for nationally binding precedent is one of the most pressing
problems in the federal judicial system. 1 20 Yet the federal judicial system

federal district courts must follow in diversity cases. Russell v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 411 F.
Supp. 111 (E.D. Okla. 1976).
116. See text accompanying notes 15-23 supra.

117. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 43 (1976).
118. lb MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.402[l], at 61-62 (2d ed. 1974).
119. Id. at 62-63.
120. Along with the incapacity for nationally binding precedent, a second problem most often
identified and studied is the overburdening caseload of the federal judiciary at all levels. These
two related problems have brought forth an abundance of scholarly criticisms, and suggestions
for the insertion of an additional rung in the federal appellate ladder, between the court of
appeals and the Supreme Court. Extensive citations to the wealth of literature on these issues
are in Comment, An Intermediate National Appellate Court: Solution or Diversion?, 22 VILL.
L. REV. 1022 (1977). The major proposal advanced in the prestigious Freund Report, which
focused on the overburdened docket of the Supreme Court, called for the creation of a National
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embraces a large geographical area comprising substantial diversity in historic, economic, social, and political arenas. If conflicts in decisions between
or among coordinate courts is undesirable in the larger federal system, the
undesirability of conflicts is intensified within a state judicial system, embracing a smaller geographical area, with presumably less diversity.
The Florida judicial structure illustrates the geographical approach on a
state level, with a separate district court of appeal for each of the four judicial districts of Florida. 121 The district courts of appeal agree that their
decisions do not bind each other, but are merely persuasive.' 22 Florida's
neat constitutional and legislative structuring of the judiciary 123 has not,
however, automatically answered Florida's vertical stare decisis problems. In
a case of first impression the fourth district court of appeal was surprised at
the suggestion that there was "confusion and uncertainty abroad among the
circuit [trial] courts as to whether they are bound to follow the decision of a
foreign District Court of Appeal." 124 In a thoughtful opinion, (then) Chief
Court of Appeals which would decide, onlthe merits, many cases of conflicts between the
circuits. Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme
Court, 57 F.R.D. 573, 590 (1972). The felt and demonstrated need for nationally binding precedent was ably presented by the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (Hruska Commission) formed by Congress in 1972. The Hruska Commission listed a sampling of twenty specific points on which there were conflicting federal court decisions that had
not been resolved by the Supreme Court. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT
APPELLATE SYSTEM,

STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL

PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATION

FOR

CHANGE 76-90 (1975). The Commission determined that the paucity of nationally binding decisions often bred uncertainty, forum shopping, and relitigation of issues previously decided in a
different circuit. See also Justice Schaeffer's Foreword in this issue of the DEPAUL LAW REVIEW, for comments calling for stare decisis among the federal courts of appeals.
121. The judicial power is "vested in a supreme court, district courts of appeal," and trial
courts. FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 1. One district court serves each appellate district. FLA. CONsT.
art. 5, § 4 (a). The districts are designated by the legislature. Id. at § 1. The chief judge for each
court of appeal is responsible for the administrative supervision of the court. FLA. CONST. art.
5, § 2(c). There is statutory recognition of separate courts of appeal: four courts of appeal are
created, "to be named District Court of Appeal,
District." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 35.06
(West 1978 Supp.). Each district court makes its own regulations for the internal government of
the court, and each has its own official seal. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 35.07, 35.09 (West 1974).
Florida authorities often emphasize that its courts of appeal are not intermediate courts, but
rather are courts of last resort, except for cases specifically made reviewable by the supreme
court. These cases include any court of appeal decision in direct conflict with another court of
appeal decision. FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 3(b)(3). In the context of this study then, it is not
erroneous to consider them as "intermediate" appellate courts. See generally Freidin, Conflict
Certiorari: Is the Supreme Court of Florida Following Its ConstitutionalMandate?, 32 U. MIA.
L. REV. 435 (1978).
122. State v. Hayes, 333 So, 2d 51 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976), citing Spencer Ladd's, Inc.
v. Lehman, 167 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964), modified on different grounds, 182
So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1966). "Within their sphere ...[Florida's] District Courts of Appeal are courts
of last resort .... As such, they draw for precedent on their own prior decisions and o decisions this Court handed down before they were in existence." Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951,
953 n.6 (Fla. 1976) (citation omitted).
123. See note 121 supra.
124. State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 54 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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Judge Walden, speaking for the court, held that where the only case on
point is from a district other than the one in which the trial court is located,
the trial court is required to follow that decision. 1 2 5 Thus, the fourth district court of appeal attempted to establish the umbrella type vertical stare
decisis in a state with four appellate courts, just as was done in Illinois at a
time when it had four appellate courts. 126 Six months later, Florida's first
district court of appeal addressed the vertical stare decisis issue and came to
a different conclusion. It rejected as "novel," and "without merit," the contention that a trial court within the "jurisdiction" of the first district court of
appeal is bound by decisions of any other district courts. 1 2 7 Thus, Florida,
like the federal system, views the decisions of its appellate courts as having
no binding effect on coordinate courts, and as binding the trial courts only in
the geographical area over which the particular appellate court presides. (Or,
if Judge Walden's opinion is accepted, a Florida appellate decision that does
not conflict with another binds all trial courts in the state.)
The organizational model of appellate courts in the Florida and federal
systems is that of multiple courts sitting in defined georgraphical regions.
The lack of horizontal stare decisis among these courts is at least consistent
with this structure. The geographical method of organization has both advantages and disadvantages. Principal of the advantages is that it accommodates
the convenience of lawyers and judges by reducing the amount of travel
time required for personal contact, an advantage the Illinois system also provides. A second potential advantage, where the number of judges in regional
courts is small, is that it offers more ready identification of the judges who
will decide the appeal. As Professor Llewellyn emphasized, a known bench
is a useful means to "reckonability."128 A third advantage, assuming the
federal approach recognizing limited vertical stare decisis is followed, is less
confusion on the trial court level. If the trial courts have only one superior
to follow, their own regional appellate court, many of the quandaries posed
12 9
in part I.D. of this Article will not arise.

125. Id., citing Garcia v. Haynes & Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 I11. App. 3d 479, 331
N.E.2d 634 (3d Dist. 1975), as well as New York and California decisions. The Florida opinion
went on to state that if the court of appeal of a district in which the trial court is located has
decided the issue, the trial court is bound to follow it.
126. See Hughes v. Medendorp, 294 Il1. App. 424, 13 N.E.2d 1015 (3d Dist. 1938). See
notes 15 and 16 supra.
127. Smith v. Venus Condominium Ass'n., Inc., 343 So.2d 1284 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1976), quashed and remanded, 352 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 1977) (in an opinion that never touched the
stare decisis point). The district court stated that binding a trial court by decisions of a court of
appeal outside its district "could lead to utter chaos were two of our sister courts to be in
conflict on a point of law raised in a trial court in this district. Also, an anomalous situation
would result were we to reverse a trial court in this district for failing to follow a decision of one
of our sister courts with which we disagreed." Id., 343 So.2d at 1285.
128. K. LLEWELLYN,

THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:

DECIDING APPEALS 17, 34 (1960).

129. The quandaries will persist, however, if there are several divisions within the regional
appellate court.
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On the other hand, a substantial disadvantage inheres in the geographical
approach. Close reading of a comment on this disadvantage by eminent appellate justice scholars is warranted:
This I substantial disadvantage] is its tendency to reinforce the instinct for
autonomy of the intermediate court judges and to promote a form of territorialisin which can be debilitating to the system. Territorialism is a
problem both theoretical and practical. Its theoretical fault is that it is
fundamentally inconsistent with the idea of law because it accepts differences resulting solely from differences in place with no basis in reason for
such divergences. In a pure form, territorialism in the administration of
the law is a denial of equal protection in the classical sense. There is
confusion in the minds of some observers about this; the confusion mistakes territorialism for federalism or for legitimate regionalism. It leads
those who are thus mistaken to suppose that territorialism is an instrument
of democracy, making the legal system more responsive to differences between regions. It is, however, hard to imagine a less effective instrument
of democratic government than al intermediate court; these institutions
are of such low public visibility and their judges are so utterly unknown to
any constituency that it is quite inaccurate to think of them as representatives of anything except the whole legal system of which they are part, and
of their own consciences. Moreover, if it were important to respond to
regional differences in the formulation of any aspect of the law, there are
both constitutional and legislative means for assuring that such decisions
are made by regionally democratic means; generally when these means are
n)t employed, it can be inferred that a democratic legislature has determined that a systei-wide uniformity is needed. Beguiling as it may be to
do so, territorialism should not be mistaken for healthy regionalism; it is,
in any legal system, a mark of weakness, a lapse in the pursuit of
evenhanded justice.
The practical disadvantages of this theoretical flaw of territorialism are
notable. It rewards and encourages appellate forum-shopping. The possibility of forum-shopping, in turn, promotes uncertainty about the law
applicable to particular transactions and thus discourages legal planning. It
is economically wasteful and undermines the effectiveness of the law as a
means of regulating conduct. 130

The evils that flow from conflicts of coordinate divisions, which have
racked the federal system, are exacerbated on a state scale. Any argument
that the state of Illinois is so diverse that different prescriptive laws should
apply in, for example Chicago, from those in Cairo, are adequately answered

in the quoted discussion of Professors Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg.
Whether or not political or economic differences within a state call for different laws is a matter for the legislature, not the appellate courts.
The organizational model of appellate courts in Illinois is a unitary court
sitting in defined geographical regions. The substantial disadvantage of territorialism that inheres in the geographical organization should be minimized
in the Illinois system, for the same reasons that it should be in multiple
130. P. CARRINGT(ON, 1). MEADO

& M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 154-55 (1976).
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appellate court systems. Additionally, the substantial disadvantage should be
minimized in Illinois because territorialism is inconsistent with its unified
appellate court structure. What is needed is the recognition that the Appellate Court of Illinois, institutionally a single body, sits in ten divisions in
order to do the work necessary to perform the function for which it was
established. Accordingly, the political delineation of districts within politically defined geographical areas serves only to provide a base from which the
electorate may choose its judges, who may nonetheless sit in any division,
and perhaps serves the additional purpose of convenience in minimizing
travel. Districts were not established to divide the state into five feudal
dukedoms. Complete disregard for horizontal stare decisis is a manifestation
of territorialism. The conditions created by territorialism, then, can be
ameliorated by a stronger, more positive acceptance of horizontal stare decisis.
3. "Absolute Binding" Model
One final approach to the stare decisis effect of decisions of intermediate
appellate courts remains to be discussed. The "absolute binding effect"
model contemplates a system in which all divisions of the appellate court are
bound by the decisions of coordinate branches of the court, as well as by
their own prior decisions. In effect, there is truly but one appellate court,
and that court is bound by its prior decisions.
An example of such an approach may be found in the English judicial
system. England's Court of Appeal serves as the intermediary court between
the nation's trial courts (the County Courts and the High Courts) and England's highest judicial body (the House of Lords).1 31 The court is divided
into a civil division and a criminal division and is composed of fourteen lord
justices and the Master of the Rolls (the chief justice). In civil cases the
court normally sits in panels or divisions of three judges, although the presiding judge on a panel has the authority to adjourn a case for argument
132
before a full court, normally consisting of five judges.
33
In Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co.,
it was stated that a decision of a
division of the court of appeal binds the court of appeal in its entirety, as
,well as other divisions of the court. 134 The court of appeal has no power to

131. F.

MORRISON,

COURTS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN ENGLAND 40-41

(1973).

132. R. CRoss, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAWV 113-14 (3d ed. 1977).

133. [1946] CA. 163.
134. [I]f the Court of Appeal, when sitting in one of its divisions, has in a previous case
pronounced on a point of law which necessarily covers a later case coming before
the court, the previous decision must be followed ... [and] this application of the
rules governing the use of precedents binds the full Court of Appeal no less than a
division of the court as usually constituted.
1d. at 169.
Lord Greene, speaking for the court of appeal in the Young case, explained the rationale
behind this concept of horizontal stare decisis as it is applied by the English judiciary:
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deviate from strict adherence to this rule of stare decisis, except out of
necessity when conflicting decisions of the court of appeal do arise, or a
court of appeal decision conflicts with a decision of the House of Lords, or
when the decision of the court was given per in curiam.1 35
The English model demonstrates horizontal stare decisis at its apex. The
advantage that could be ascribed to this model over a more flexible stare
decisis approach is, of course, consistency of decisions. However, like any
other virtue, consistency may be carried to an extreme, and under this
model justice in the individual case may be completely disregarded. Indeed,
even the stability held so precious by proponents of an absolute, binding
model may not truly materialize. Although the courts of England have
claimed to hold steadfastly to the rules laid down in prior adjudications, it
has been observed that they carry "the technique of distinguishing to a very
high pitch of ingenuity." 136 Thus, the stability of such a system may be
solely cosmetic: the theory, apparently, is that the outward appearance of
stability is what is important. Such a policy has been aptly criticized by Mr.
Justice Douglas: "A judiciary that discloses what it is doing and why it does
it will breed understanding. And confidence based on understanding is more
enduring than confidence based on awe." 137 The English approach affects
either stagnation of the law or else judicial gamesmanship; it should thus be
rejected as too rigid an application of stare decisis.
To be sure, a satisfactory median can be found between the Oklahoma
system, in which no precedential value is assigned an appellate court decision, and the English system, in which a decision of the appellate court,
once finalized, is irrevocably the law of the land until the issue is reviewed
by a higher court. Such a compromise is the topic of discussion in the following section.
B. Recommended Refinements in the Illinois Model
The current structure of the Illinois judiciary, in particular the Appellate
Court of Illinois, is the result of a century of development, and serves well
as a base upon which a satisfactory, even excellent, appellate process may
The Court of Appeal is a creature of statute and its powers are statutory. It is one
court though it usually sits in two or three divisions. Each division has co-ordinate
jurisdiction, but the full court has no greater powers or jurisdiction than any division of the court.- . [I]n the majority of cases there is an appeal from its decisions
to the House of Lords either with the leave of the Court of Appeal or of the House
of Lords. Neither in the statute itself nor . . . in decided cases is there any suggestion that the powers of the Court of Appeal sitting with six or nine or more members are greater than those which it possesses when sitting as a division with three
members. In this respect ... what can be done by a full court can equally well be
done by a division of the court.
Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., 1 K.B. 718, 725 (1944).
135. Id. at 729-30.
136. Radin, The Trail of the Calf, 32 CORN. L.Q. 137, 143 (1946).
137. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 754 (1949).
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function. The only major flaw in the system is the confusion and lack of
uniformity caused by the numerous rules and "guidelines" for the determination of the stare decisis effect of the decisions of the appellate court. Thus,
our recommendations shall center upon improvement at this point, rather
than upon structural changes in the system.
One of the causes of conflicts among the divisions may well be an excess
of independence-each division refuses to admit that a coordinate division
can bind by precedent- 138 but too much deference to presume to overrule
a coordinate division. What is needed is a recognition by the members of
the appellate court that they are but a single court, "a judicial alliance,"
and that, based on such allegiance, substantial precedential weight should
be attached to the decisions of their brethren sitting in the other divisions and districts. Judge George N. Leighton, 139 when sitting on the Appellate Court of Illinois, followed a point of law established by a coordinate appellate division 140 with the judicious comment: "Absent compelling
differences of controlling precedent to the contrary, the decision of another
appellate division should be followed." 141
More specifically, a two-pronged solution would ameliorate the problems
caused by lack of horizontal stare decisis, and thereby extricate trial judges
from dilemmas imposed by vertical stare decisis. First, the appellate court
should recognize, or, if necessary, the supreme court should declare, that a
decision by the appellate court binds the appellate court in all of its divisions. Except in rare instances, for compelling reasons (not merely preference for an alternative rule), where circumstances require a departure from
the established rule, the decision should be followed. Second, in those rare
instances when a division does depart from an earlier ruling of the appellate
court, the later conflicting decision should specifically overrule the former,
and, with or without a declaration by the deciding court to this effect, the
later decision should be deemed by all Illinois courts to have overruled the
former. In all situations where the decisions involve an issue of such importance that it should be finally decided by the supreme court (and most such
cases will), the overruling appellate court should certify to the supreme
142
court for mandatory review.

138. See quotation from P. CARRINGTON at text accompanying note 130 supra.

139. Presently a Judge for the United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois.
140. Campbell v. Dept. of Public Aid, 9 I11.App. 3d 962, 294 N.E.2d 698 (1st Dist. 1973),
modified, 61 111. 2d 1, 329 N.E.2d 225 (1975).
141. Cornue v. Weaver, 29 I11. App. 3d 546, 553 n.1, 331 N.E.2d 148, 154 n.1 (1st Dist.
1975), rev'd, sub non Cornue v. Dept. of Public Aid, 64 I11.2d 78, 354 N.E. 359 (1976). That
the point of law in Campbell, followed in Cornue, was later rejected by the supreme court, and
Cornue accordingly reversed on the point, does not detract from the significance or wisdom of
Judge Leighton's accepting the coordinate decision as precedent until it was rejected by the
supreme court.
142. Contra, Roe v. Estate of Farrell, 42 I11.App. 3d 705, 356 N.E.2d 344 (3d Dist. 1976),
rev'd on merits after leave to appeal granted, 69 I11. 2d 525, 372 N.E.2d 662 (1978), where
certification was denied despite conflict with another division. See also note 59 supra.
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The approach advocated has been adopted by other judicial systems without carrying the concept of horizontal deference to the extreme of the English courts. The attitude taken by the Arizona Court of Appeals may serve
as a model for the Appellate Court of Illinois. The following language from
an opinion of the Arizona court is demonstrative of this attitude:
Having found no prior Arizona Supreme Court decisions [on the] question pending before this Court, we now consider prior decisions of the
Court of Appeals . ... As a threshold matter, we note that while we
would not be absolutely bound by prior Court of Appeals decisions, the
principle of stare decisis and the need for stability in the law in order to
have an efficient and effective functioning of our judicial machinery dictate
that we consider the decisions of coordinate courts as highly persuasive
and binding, unless we are convinced that the prior decisions are based
upon clearly erroneous principles, or conditions have changed so as to
4
render these prior decisions inapplicable.1 3

Additionally, a division of the Arizona court has said: "We believe that this
division sits as an independent division, being part of a single court, and that
we should not disagree with our own decisions or those of the other divisions unless presented with the most cogent of reasons." 144
In sum, our recommendation for the refinement of the appellate process
in Illinois is that divisions of the appellate court recognize that decisions of
coordinate branches of that court do cast a stare decisis net upon the tribunal as to all its parts. However, the "stare decisis" of which we here speak

is not that which was recognized by Shakespeare as being unbending:

143. Castillo v. Indus. Comm'n, 21 Ariz. App. 465, 520 P.2d 1142, 1148 (1974). Contra,
Martinez v. Cardwell, 25 Ariz. App. 253, 542 P.2d 1133 (1975), Williams v. Garrett, 4 Ariz.
App. 7, 417 P.2d 378 (1966).
144. Streenz v. Streenz, 11 Ariz. App. 10, 461 P.2d 186, 187 (1969). The Arizona court
described its view of the stare decisis effect of decisions of the coordinate branches of the court
in the following words:
The appellees in the case now before us urge that the Judges of Division One of
the Court of Appeals are bound by [the decision of Division Two]. Even though the
Court of Appeals sits in two independent Divisions, it is, nevertheless, a single
Court and the argument that we are bound by [the decision of Division Two] is one
of great merit. When we disagree with a prior decision of our Court whether rendered by our own Division or by our fellow Judges in Division Two, we should do
so only upon the most cogent of reasons being presented.
Neil B. McGinnis Equip. Co. v. Henson, 2 Ariz. App. 59, 406 P.2d 409, 412 (1965). See Baker
v. Lorillard, 4 N.Y. 257, 261 (1850); Leavitt v. Morrow, 6 Ohio St. 72, 78, 67 Am. Dec. 334,
337 (1856). Perhaps the best articulation of the concept we suggest here came from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia:
Stare decisis is not a rule of law but is a matter of judicial policy ....
It is a policy
which promotes certainty, stability and uniformity in the law. It should be deviated
from only when urgent reason requires deviation. However, stare decisis is not an
inflexible policy. In the rare case when it clearly is apparent that an error has been
made or that the application of an outmoded rule, due to changing conditions, results in injustice, deviation from that policy is warranted.
Adkins v. St. Francis Hospital, 143 S.E.2d 154, 162 (W.Va. 1965) (citation omitted).
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There is no power in Venice
Can alter a decree established.
'Twill be recorded for a precedent,
And many an error by the same example
145
Will rush into the state.

Rather, the stare decisis here advocated is a more flexible doctrine designed
to introduce uniformity and stability into a legal system without introducing
rigidity. It preserves the laudable vertical stare decisis that was established
even before the unification of the appellate court. But it recognizes the im-

plication of that court's unification which calls for horizontal stare decisis.
The Illinois system presents an excellent model for the advantageous utilization of geographically based divisions of the appellate court without the substantial disadvantage of territorialism that rears its head in models featuring
multiple appellate courts.
AFTERWORD

Three sets of conflicts recently created by the Appellate Court of Illinois
supply an appropriate afterword to this study. In each of the three situations
the appellate court filed conflicting opinions on the same day. Thus, the
reach of stare decisis as discussed in this Article-that a decision of one
court binds it in its later decisions-was evaded.
On May 26, 1978, two panels of the appellate court sitting in the fourth
district filed decisions involving the constitutionality of the statute of limitations governing medical malpractice suits. 146 In one decision, the court
held the statute unconstitutional; 147 in the other decision, the court held the
148
statute constitutional.

On September 29, 1978, three panels of the appellate court sitting in the
fourth district filed decisions involving the issue of per se conflicts of interest
of criminal defense attorneys also employed as special assistant attorneys
general on a part-time basis. In two decisions, the court held that a per se
conflict of interest rule did not exist where the defense attorney in a
burglary case was a special assistant attorney general for workers' compensa-

145. W. SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE, Act 4, Scene 1.
146. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1977), provides that no action for damages for injury or
death against any physician or licensed hospital may be brought more than four years after the
act, omission, or occurrence complained of, regardless of the discovery date.
147. Woodward v. Burnham City Hospital, 60 I11.App. 3d 285, 377 N.E.2d 290 (4th Dist.
1978) (Craven, J. & Mills, J., concurring; Trapp, J., dissenting). The majority found that the
granting of immunity for hospitals and physicians while denying immunity to others in the
health care profession was clearly a special privilege in violation of Article IV, § 13, of the
Illinois constitution. Id. at 288, 377 N.E.2d at 292.
148. Anderson v. Wagner, 61 I11.App. 3d 822, 378 N.E.2d 805 (4th Dist. 1978) (Reardon, J.
& Trapp, J., concurring; Mills, J., dissenting). The majority in Anderson found that § 22.1 was
constitutional and thus barred plaintiffs cause of action. Id. at 832, 378 N.E.2d at 812.
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tion matters, 149 or where the defense attorneys in an Illinois Antitrust Act
case were members of firms that had partners who were special assistant
attorneys general for condemnation and public aid matters. 15 0 These decisions purported to overrule a 1975 fourth district decision which held a lack
of proof of actual prejudice irrelevant in that the conflict of interest exists
per se by reason of a criminal defense attorney's association with the attorney general's office. 1 5 1 In a third decision, filed on September 29, 1978,
the court followed the 1975 opinion in finding a per se conflict of interest
where a defense attorney in a cannabis case was a special assistant attorney
152
general for workers' compensation matters.
On July 13, 1978, two panels of the appellate court sitting in the fifth
district filed decisions involving Illinois' prohibition against eavesdropping. A
statutory exception applies when the surveillance is done "with the consent
of any one party to such conversation and at the request of a State's Attorney
....
In one decision the court held that the statute did not require
that a written request specifically naming a particular individual to be the
subject of the proposed surveillance, be filed by the state's attorney. 154 In
the other decision the court held that the statute required that state's attorney authorizations of eavesdroppings specifically identify the person to be
155
the subject of surveillance.

149. People v. Rogers, 64 I11. App. 3d 290, 382 N.E.2d 1236 (4th Dist. 1978) (Mills, J. &
Green, J., concurring; Craven, J., dissenting).
150. People v. Crawford Distributing Co., 65 I11. App. 3d 790, 382 N.E.2d 1223 (4th Dist.
1978) (Green, J. & Mills, J., concurring; Trapp, J., dissenting).
151. People v. Cross, 30 I11. App. 3d 199, 331 N.E.2d 643 (4th Dist. 1975).
152. People v. Fife, 65 III. App. 3d 805, 382 N.E.2d 1234 (4th Dist. 1978) (Reardon, J. &
Trapp, J., concurring; Green, J., dissenting).
153. THE CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961, 1961 I11.Laws § 14-2(a), at 1983, as amended by P.A.
76-1110 of June 24, 1969, Laws 1969 at 2239.
Subsequent to the surveillance in the cases here under consideration, the statute was
amended to read: "A person commits eavesdropping when he: (1) Uses an eavesdropping device
to hear or record all or any part of any conversation unless he does so (1) with the consent of all
the parties to such conversation or (2) with the consent of any one party to such conversation
and in accordance with Article 108A of the 'Code of Criminal Procedures of 1965' . . .. Article
108A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, "Judicial supervision of the use of eavesdropping
devices," also empowers state's attorneys merely to authorize applications to circuit judges for
orders approving the use of eavesdropping devices. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 108A-1 (1977).
154. People v. Mosley, 63 I11. App. 3d 437, 379 N.E.2d 1240 (5th Dist. 1978) (Jones, J. &
Wineland, J., concurring; Moran, J., dissenting). The court held all that need be shown to allow
an instance of eavesdropping to fall within the exception was (1) that one of the parties consented to the surveillance, and (2) that a request for the surveillance was made by a state's
attorney.
155. People v. Kezerian, 63 I11.App. 3d 610, 379 N.E.2d 1246 (5th Dist. 1978) (Moran, J. &
Eberspacher, J., concurring; Jones, J., dissenting). The court believed that the statute required
that state's attorney's authorizations of eavesdropping specifically identify the person to be the
subject of the surveillance. Absent such specificity, the requests were believed to be too broad,
amounting to delegation of the state's attorney's authority to agents of the Illinois Bureau of
Investigation.
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Several points should be noted in regard to these three sets of conflicts.
First, interestingly enough, since the panels involved filed the conflicting
decisions in each set of cases on the same day, any application of stare decisis on the horizontal plane has technically been avoided. Second, these
decisions place trial judges in the untenable position of having to decide
cases directly contrary to one or more "controlling" appellate decisions.
Moreover, the filing of the conflicting decisions within one district does
nothing to soften the state-wide impact of the conflict. Recall that under
Medendorp, 156 decisions of the appellate court bind all trial courts in the
state. Third, the almost cavalier creation of these conflicts demonstrates that
the values sought to be protected by stare decisis weigh too lightly in the
minds of some appellate judges as against strong preferences for one rule of
substantive law over another. If it is thought that "resolving conflicts is what
the supreme court is there for," it must be remembered that occasion for
the supreme court to resolve substantive conflicts is totally fortuitous. Litigants often refrain from seeking further review of adverse decisions because of
financial, strategic, or other considerations.
Fortunately, leave to appeal has been granted in two of the sets of cases
discussed in this afterword. 1 57 It is hoped that the supreme court will
utilize the opportunity to revitalize the values of stare decisis within the
158
Appellate Court of Illinois.

156. 294 I11.App. 424, 13 N.E.2d 1015 (3d Dist. 1938). See discussion in text accompanying
notes 24-32 supra.
157. Just prior to the publication of this Article, the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the
constitutionality of the medical malpractice statute of limitations, affirming Anderson v. Wagner,
61 111. App. 3d 822, 378 N.E.2d 805 (4th Dist. 1978). The court recognized the existence of the
conflict without commenting on the evasive practice utilized by the fourth district. Anderson v.
Wagner, Nos. 50880, 50980, 50981 consol (II., filed Oct. 2, 1979).
158. But see note 157 supra.

